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Abstract
Appearance-based trustworthiness inferences may reflect the misinterpretation of emotional expression cues. Children and
adults typically perceive faces that look happy to be relatively trustworthy and those that look angry to be relatively
untrustworthy. Given reports of atypical expression perception in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), the current
study aimed to determine whether the modulation of trustworthiness judgments by emotional expression cues in children
with ASD is also atypical. Cognitively-able children with and without ASD, aged 6–12 years, rated the trustworthiness of
faces showing happy, angry and neutral expressions. Trust judgments in children with ASD were significantly modulated by
overt happy and angry expressions, like those of typically-developing children. Furthermore, subtle emotion cues in neutral
faces also influenced trust ratings of the children in both groups. These findings support a powerful influence of emotion
cues on perceived trustworthiness, which even extends to children with social cognitive impairments.
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Introduction
The face plays an important role in social cognition, with people
routinely inferring personality traits from an individual’s appear-
ance [1]. Evaluations of an individual’s trustworthiness are one of
the many important appearance-based trait inferences made on a
daily basis [2]. Although not necessarily accurate, adults make
reliable, automatic trustworthiness attributions after very brief
exposure to faces and these judgments can have a substantial
impact on social interactions, influencing how people behave
towards others [3–6].
There has recently been increasing interest in trait inferences in
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), which is characterised by social
cognitive impairments [7]. Individuals with ASD often have
difficulties understanding the mental state of others and reading
social information from faces [8–10], which may be critical for
these appearance-based trait inferences. Trustworthiness judg-
ments are of particular interest in this group because imaging
studies have revealed that the amygdala, which is involved in trust
perception [11–13], may be atypical in individuals with ASD
[8,14–16].
Current findings regarding facial trustworthiness judgments in
ASD are mixed. Some studies report no significant differences in
trustworthiness judgments between typical adults and adults with
ASD [17–19]. Other studies report that individuals with ASD
significantly overrate the trustworthiness of negatively valenced
faces [11,20,21]. Critically however, in these latter studies the
responses of adults with ASD are highly variable and overlap
considerably with the responses of the typical adults [11] and in
one study the group differences did not survive correction for
multiple comparisons [20]. Taken together, these findings provide
limited support for differences in facial trust perception between
adults with and without ASD. Still, there may be other atypicalities
in responses to trustworthy and untrustworthy faces in individuals
with ASD. For example, there have been some reports of atypical
neural [18] and autonomic [17] responses in adults with ASD
during trust evaluation tasks.
A critical feature of trust perception that is yet to be investigated
in individuals with ASD is the role of emotional expression cues.
Researchers propose that facial expressions of emotion may
convey not only an individual’s current affective state, but also
more stable trait impressions, such as trustworthiness, consistent
with that emotion [22–24]. In particular, happy and angry
expressions have been associated with perceived trustworthiness,
with happy expressions found to increase the appearance of
trustworthiness and angry expressions found to diminish it [25–
30]. When these expressions are overtly expressed the process is
known as temporal extension [24]. When these expressions are
very subtle, such as those perceptible in neutral faces, the
phenomenon is known as emotion overgeneralization [31]. There
is also evidence that this association between perceived trustwor-
thiness and facial cues to emotion is bidirectional. For example,
computer-modelling studies have shown that manipulating the
trustworthiness of faces influences their perceived emotional
expressions [26]. These findings suggest a strong association
between emotional expressions and perceived facial trustworthi-
ness.
The same may not be the case however for individuals with
ASD, who often demonstrate difficulties extracting emotional
information from faces. Indeed the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders-IV (DSM-IV) criteria for ASD
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include items related to deficits in identifying and processing
emotion, such as the use of facial expressions, lack of emotional
sharing and impaired responses to others emotions [7]. The extent
of emotion processing deficits in ASD remains a topic of much
debate [32,33–35], but the conclusions of a recent meta-analysis of
48 studies support a general impairment in emotion recognition in
individuals with ASD [32]. Given the association between
perceived emotion and trustworthiness, it seems plausible that
difficulties reading emotional information from faces could disrupt
the typical modulation of trust inferences by expression cues.
The current study aimed to directly examine the influence of
emotional expressions on trust judgments in children with ASD.
Children with and without ASD, aged 6 to 12 years, made
trustworthiness ratings of neutral faces and faces displaying happy
and angry expressions. We created two intensity levels of overtly
expressed happiness and anger (25% and 50%) and looked for
evidence of temporal extension. We also looked for evidence of
overgeneralization of emotion cues present in neutral expression
faces. Temporal extension and emotion overgeneralization have
both been shown to occur in trust judgments of typical adults [26–
30], older adults [25] and typically-developing children [36]. Here,
we were interested to see whether these effects also extend to
children with ASD. Specifically, we were interested in whether
cues to anger diminish the appearance of trustworthiness for
children with ASD and whether cues to happiness increase it.
We also measured expression recognition ability to assess
whether any differences in the modulatory effects of emotion are
related to differences in expression sensitivity between our two
participant groups. Evidence of impaired expression processing and
reduced modulation of trust judgments by expression in children
with ASD could signal that expression recognition is critical for
trustworthiness attribution. In contrast, evidence of intact expres-
sion processing without modulation of trust judgments could
suggest that children with ASD have atypical sensitivity to the
social affordances of expression cues.
Method
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the Human Research Ethics
Committee at the University of Western Australia and all parents
provided written consent prior to their child’s participation in the
project. All children also gave verbal and written consent before
taking part. The individual displayed in figure 1 of this manuscript
has given written informed consent (as outlined in PLOS consent
form) to publish a recognizable image.
Participants
Fifteen cognitively-able boys with ASD aged 6 years 9 months
to 12 years 8 months (M=9:3, SD= 1:10) were recruited from the
West Australian Register for Autism Spectrum Disorders, local
schools and community groups. They had all received an
independent diagnosis of an ASD by a multidisciplinary team
following DSM-IV criteria [37]. Parents completed the Social
Communication Questionnaire (SCQ) [38], a retrospective
questionnaire measure of their children’s autism symptomatology.
All children scored at or above the cut-off for clinically significant
levels of autistic symptomatology (score of 12) [39]. Children also
completed Module 3 of the Autism Diagnostic Observation
Schedule-2 (ADOS-2) [40], with six participants scoring below
the cut-off (score of 7) on this semi-structured standardized
assessment of current autism symptomatology. Note - When the
data were reanalysed including only those children with ASD who
scored above the ADOS-2 cut-off for current ASD symptoms the
pattern of results remained unchanged (see Appendix S1).
In addition, 15 typically-developing children (8 male) aged
between 6 years 3 months and 11 years 6 months (M=8:10,
SD= 1:9) were recruited from local schools and community
groups. These children were well matched to the children with
ASD on chronological age, non-verbal IQ and full-scale IQ, and
did not differ significantly in terms of verbal IQ (see Table 1). Six
additional children were excluded prior to matching due to
inattention (ASD= 1, Typical = 1) or difficulties understanding the
concept of trustworthiness (ASD=2, Typical = 2) during testing.
No typically-developing child displayed clinically significant levels
of ASD symptomatology, as indicated by scores on the SCQ. Face
recognition was significantly impaired in the children with ASD
relative to this typical group (see Table 1), as indexed by scores on
the Cambridge Face Memory Test – for Children (CFMT-C) [41].
An additional 16 adults (18–54 years, M= 29.1, SD=10.9; 4
male) were recruited to rate the neutral face stimuli from the trust
rating task on their resemblance to happy and angry expressions.
Procedure
The trust rating task and expression recognition task were run
on a 15-inch MacBook Pro laptop computer and were part of a
larger battery of unrelated tasks conducted with participants over
two or three 90–120 minute activity sessions in the family home,
school or at the University of Western Australia. The experimenter
sat alongside the child throughout all tasks to monitor engagement
and provide verbal encouragement.
Trust ratings. Participants rated the trustworthiness of faces
displaying happy, angry and neutral expressions. Children were
told that an Alien named Zeb needed help to complete a mission
to learn more about human trustworthiness. They were given a
brief description of trustworthiness that focused on three key
elements of trust: honesty, reliability and emotional trust [42,43].
They then answered three questions to confirm they understood
our operationalization of trustworthiness: Sarah watched her little
Figure 1. An example of expression stimuli used in the trust rating task. A happy, neutral and angry expression at 25% intensity (A) and 50%
intensity (B). The identity displayed here did not appear in the stimulus set.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097644.g001
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brother like she promised. Would you trust Sarah?; Jake copied
the test answers from the person sitting next to him. Would you
trust Jake?; Mia hasn’t told anyone that her best friend is afraid of
the dark. Would you trust Mia? If participants responded
incorrectly to any item, we repeated our description of trust and
repeated all three questions (one child with ASD required
repetition). Any participant who still could not respond correctly
to all questions was excluded (see above).
The stimuli were images of faces displaying happy, angry and
neutral expressions (Figure 1). They were generated from 20
neutral Caucasian faces (10 male) [44], with mid-range trustwor-
thiness ratings (adults used a scale ranging from 1 ‘‘not at all
trustworthy’’ to 9 ‘‘extremely trustworthy’’; M=5.0, SD= 0.4)
[45]. Each identity was morphed, using Fantamorph v5.3.1
(http://www.fantamorph.com), with three composite faces dis-
playing happy, angry and neutral expressions respectively (each an
average of 50 identities) [46]. We morphed the original (neutral
expression) images towards a neutral composite, for the neutral
face condition, to ensure that all stimuli were morphs. Standard
morphing procedures were used to create morphs at 25% and
50% by blending the original faces with the composites in different
proportions, e.g. a 25% angry morph was a 75/25 blend of an
original face and the angry composite. There were 120 stimuli in
total: 3 expressions (happy, angry, neutral)62 intensities (25%,
50%)620 identities.
On each trial, a face was presented on screen for 1500 ms for
participants to rate with the number keys using a 7-point scale
consisting of numbered cups (1 = not very trustworthy to 7= very
trustworthy) [47]. Faces subtended an average visual angle of
8.4u66.3u at an approximate viewing distance of 50 cm. Each trial
was initiated with a space-bar press. The 120 faces were presented
in randomized order in 6 blocks of 20 trials. Between each block
participants were given a break in which they were told ‘fun facts’
about Zeb the alien. Participants began with 10 practice trials: 4
trials using well-known cartoon faces (2 trustworthy, 2 male) and 6
trials using real faces (3 expressions62 intensities). Stimuli used for
practice trials were not used in the main task.
The neutral expressions were also rated on their resemblance to
happy and angry facial expressions by a group of typical adults.
Ratings of emotional expressions (happy, angry) were obtained
using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all happy/angry to 7= very
happy/angry). Participants were informed that all faces would be
emotionally neutral but could nevertheless show subtle variations
in emotional information. They were encouraged to use the whole
range of the scale.
Expression recognition. The expression recognition task
was adapted from Gao and Maurer [48,49]. Children were told
that they would be shown the faces of people who were watching
different movies that made them feel different things. They were
told to select the expression, from five cartoon emoticon-style
faces, which best matched what the person was feeling. The
experimenter emphasized that there could be different intensity
expressions.
The stimuli were photographs of four models (two male) from
the NimStim Face Stimulus Set [50] each posing happy, angry,
sad, fearful and neutral expressions. Eight levels of intensity (0, 10,
20, 30, 40, 60, 80, 100) were created for each of the four
expressions by morphing between neutral (0%) expressions and
100% intensity levels in varying degrees [48]. This resulted in 128
stimuli: (4 expressions67 intensity levels64 models)+(4 neutral
expressions64 models).
Each trial began with a face presented on screen for 1000 ms
followed by a response screen that prompted the participant to
indicate the expression that corresponded to what the person was
feeling. Children pointed to the appropriate icon and the
experimenter pressed the corresponding key to reduce the
cognitive demands of the task. There were 128 trials in total
presented in randomized order. To ensure task duration was age-
appropriate the task was split into two sessions. Two different
models (one male) were presented in each session (64 trials in
total), with order of model presentation counterbalanced between
participants.
Results
Two extreme scores defined by SPSS (one ASD 50% angry
difference score and one ASD happy expression recognition
threshold) were replaced with the next lowest score. Following
replacement of these scores all distributions of trust and expression
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for age, cognitive ability and autism symptomatology measures.
Measure Group
ASD (n=15) Typical (n = 15)
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range Cohen’s d
Age (months) 110.9 (21.6) 81–152 106.0 (20.9) 75–138 t(28) =2.63, p= .54 0.24
Nonverbal IQa 107.8 (17.6) 84–134 105.3 (13.4) 81–129 t(28) =2.43, p= .67 0.16
Verbal IQa 96.5 (11.1) 81–118 102.1 (7.3) 87–114 t(24.22) = 1.64, p= .12e 0.67
Full Scale IQa 101.6 (12.7) 87–125 104.0 (6.5) 88–112 t(20.89) = .65, p= .52e 0.28
SCQb 25.5 (6.8) 12–34 1.7 (2.4) 0–8 t(17.41) =212.84, p,.001e 6.16
ADOS-2b,c 7.9 (5.3) 0–21
CFMT-Cd 69.3 (9.1) 52–82 77.1 (12.1) 57–97 t(28) = 1.99, p= .03f 0.75
aNonverbal and verbal IQ were measured with the WASI [65]: Matrix Reasoning and Block Design (nonverbal IQ) and Similarities and Vocabulary (verbal IQ). Full-scale IQ
(FSIQ) was derived by standardizing the sum of both verbal and performance ability scores against age-based norms.
bHigher scores on both the SCQ [38] and ADOS-2 [40] indicate a greater degree of autism symptomatology.
cADOS-2 score reported =Communication+Social Interaction algorithm total (cut-off = 7).
dAccuracy (total percentage correct) on the Cambridge Face Memory Test - for Children [41].
eEqual variances not assumed.
fOne-tailed independent samples t-test.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097644.t001
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judgments for each group were normal and therefore appropriate
for parametric analysis [51].
Trustworthiness from Expressive Faces (Temporal
Extension)
We were interested in the extent to which overt happy and
angry expressions modulated trust judgments in children with
ASD, relative to typically-developing children. Given the absence
of any specific predictions about the relative magnitude of effects
for the two expressions, we did not equate the intensity of the
happy and angry expressions and we consider them separately in
our analysis. In each case we used a 262 mixed ANOVA to
investigate the effects of group (ASD, typical) and intensity (25%,
50%) on the influence of expression on trust ratings, indexed as the
difference between trust ratings of expressive faces and neutral
faces (see below). Descriptive statistics for each group’s trustwor-
thiness ratings of the angry, neutral and happy expression faces are
shown in Table 2.
Angry faces. The dependent variable was the mean differ-
ence between trustworthiness ratings of the angry and neutral faces
(neutral minus angry). One sample t-tests revealed that this value
was significantly greater than zero for the typically-developing
children for the 25% and 50% angry faces, all ts .2.21, ps ,.05,
Cohen’s ds .1.18, which confirms that angry expressions had the
predicted negative effect on perceived trustworthiness. The
children with ASD also showed a significant difference from zero
for the 50% angry expressions, t(14)= 3.15, p = .007 and Cohen’s
d = 1.68, and a marginal difference from zero for the 25%
expressions, t(14)= 2.02, p = .063 and Cohen’s d = 1.08 (Figure 2).
Our ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of intensity on
the influence of anger, F(1, 28) = 7.58, p = .01, partial g2 = .21.
Angry expressions influenced trustworthiness more at 50%
(M= 0.7, SD= 0.8) than at 25% (M= 0.3, SD= 0.5). There was
no main effect of group, F(1, 28) = 0.40, p = .53, partial g2 = .01,
and no interaction of group and intensity, F(1, 28) = 0.31, p = .58,
partial g2 = .01 (Figure 2).
Happy faces. The dependent variable was the mean
difference between trustworthiness ratings assigned to the happy
and neutral faces (happy minus neutral). One sample t-tests
indicated that this value was significantly greater than zero for
children with ASD and typically-developing children at both
intensities, all ts .2.30, ps ,.05, Cohen’s ds .1.23 (Figure 3).
Thus cues to happiness had a positive effect on perceived facial
trustworthiness in children with and without ASD.
Our ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of intensity on
the influence of happiness, F(1, 28) = 12.35, p = .002, partial
g2 = .31. Happy expressions influenced trustworthiness judgments
more at 50% (M= 1.6, SD= 1.9) than at 25% (M= 1.0, SD= 1.3).
As with the angry cues, there was no significant difference between
the groups, F(1, 28) = 0.006, p = .94, partial g2,.001, and no
interaction between group and intensity, F(1, 28) = 0.03, p = .86,
partial g2 = .001, indicating that the influence of happy cues on
trustworthiness judgments did not differ for the children with ASD
and typically-developing children (Figure 3).
We also investigated whether the influence of emotion
expressions on trust judgments was associated with ASD
symptomatology, as indexed by SCQ scores, in our sample of
children. This analysis revealed no significant correlations between
the modulatory power of 25% happy expressions, 50% happy
expressions, or 50% angry expressions and SCQ scores (see
Table 3). However, there was a significant positive correlation
between symptom severity and the modulatory power of the 25%
angry expressions. This correlation suggests that greater symptom
severity was associated with greater influence of the 25% angry
expressions on trust judgments.
Trustworthiness from Neutral Faces (Emotion
Overgeneralization)
To assess whether there was also an association between
perceived trustworthiness and more subtle emotional expressions
for children with ASD we looked at the relationship between the
children’s trustworthiness ratings and adults’ ratings of the subtle
emotion cues present in the neutral expression face stimuli. The
internal consistency of the adult expression ratings was high
(Cronbach’s alpha= .86 and.93 for angry and happy expressions
respectively) but the internal consistency of the trust ratings was
low and did not support averaging across participants (Cronbach’s
alpha=2.30 and 2.44 for the ASD and typical group respec-
tively). We therefore computed separate correlation coefficients for
the association between trust ratings and mean expression ratings
(happy, angry) of each identity for each participant. Fisher’s r to z
transformation was applied to these correlation coefficients prior
to analysis [52].
One-tailed, one sample t-tests indicated that the mean
correlation between trust and anger ratings was significantly
different from zero (i.e., negative) for children with ASD (M=2
.10, SD= .20), as well as the typically-developing children (M=2
.14, SD= .21), both ts.21.80, ps ,.05, Cohen’s ds .0.97. The
mean correlation between trust and happiness ratings was
significantly greater than zero for the typically-developing children
(M= .14, SD= .21), t(14) = 2.56, p= .02, Cohen’s d=1.37, and
showed a similar trend for the children with ASD (M= .09,
SD= .24), but this value did not reach significance, t(14) = 1.40,
p= .09, Cohen’s d=0.75. These results suggest subtle emotion
cues in neutral faces influence trust ratings of children with ASD as
well as typically-developing children.
A 262 mixed ANOVA on the trust correlations, with group
(ASD, typical) as a between-participants factor and expression
(angry, happy) as a within-participants factor revealed no main
effect of group, F(1, 28) = 0.06, p = .81, partial g2 = .002, and no
interaction between group and expression, F(1, 28) = 0.43, p = .52,
partial g2 = .015. These results indicate that the children with ASD
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for trustworthiness ratings of the 25% and 50% angry, neutral and happy faces for each group.
25% 50%
Angry Neutral Happy Angry Neutral Happy
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
ASD 3.4 (1.3) 3.7 (1.2) 4.7 (1.0) 3.1 (1.4) 3.7 (1.4) 5.4 (1.3)
Typical 3.6 (0.9) 3.9 (0.8) 4.9 (0.8) 3.1 (1.3) 4.0 (0.9) 5.5 (1.0)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097644.t002
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did not differ from typical children with regard to the influence of
subtle emotion cues from neutral faces on trust judgments. There
was a main effect of expression, F(1, 28) = 9.34, p = .005, partial
g2 = .25, which reflected the difference between the negative
association between trust and anger ratings (M=2.12, SD= .20)
and the positive association between trust and happiness ratings
(M= .11, SD= .22).
Expression Recognition
We calculated children’s thresholds for correctly identifying
happy and angry expressions on our recognition task [48,49]. For
each participant we fitted a cumulative Gaussian function to the
responses for each intensity level for each expression in Graphpad
Prism 5. The threshold level represents the intensity level at which
the face was correctly identified as happy or angry (50% of the
time). The data for two participants (one typical and one ASD)
were removed due to poor fits (R2,.5).
We used a 262 mixed ANOVA to examine the effects of
expression (happy, angry) and group (ASD, typical) on this
measure of expression sensitivity. There was a significant main
effect of expression, F(1, 26) = 5.78, p = .024, partial g2 = .18, with
children more sensitive to the happy expressions (M= 0.3,
SD= 0.1) than the angry expressions (M= 0.4, SD= 0.1). There
Figure 2. Anger modulation of trust ratings. Mean difference (SEM) in trustworthiness ratings for angry and neutral expressions at 25% (A) and
50% (B) intensity for each group. Larger values indicate greater modulation of angry expressions on trust judgments and zero indicates no
modulation. Individual participants are shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097644.g002
Figure 3. Happy modulation of trust ratings. Mean difference (SEM) in trustworthiness ratings for happy and neutral expressions at 25% (A) and
50% (B) intensity for each group. Larger values indicate greater influence of happy expressions on trust judgments and zero indicates no modulation.
Individual participants are shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097644.g003
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was no main effect of group, F(1, 26) = 0.29, p = .59, partial
g2 = .01, and no interaction between group and expression, F(1,
26) = 2.19, p = .15, partial g2 = .08. This indicates that the children
with ASD did not differ from the typical group with respect to
their sensitivity to happy and angry expressions (Figure 4).
Discussion
We found that facial trustworthiness judgments in children with
ASD were significantly modulated by happy and angry emotional
expressions, like typically-developing children. These results
suggest that facial expressions of emotion not only communicate
emotional states but also contribute to impressions of trustworthi-
ness for cognitively-able children with ASD.
Our findings extend previous trust perception research in ASD,
which has solely focused on adults’ trust attributions [11,17–21].
Here, we show that children with ASD, who may be less likely
than adults to have developed compensatory mechanisms to
overcome social cognitive difficulties, draw upon emotion cues
when making inferences of trustworthiness from faces. Specifically,
overt angry expressions diminished the appearance of trustwor-
thiness and overt happy expressions increased the appearance of
trustworthiness in faces for them. Although the effects of the 25%
angry expressions did not reach significance, there was a large
effect size and no group differences relative to the typical children,
which suggests that the non-significant result reflected our small
sample size rather than reduced modulatory power for subtle
angry cues. These results suggest that trait attributions in children
with ASD may reflect the temporal extension of transient facial
cues as signals of more enduring characteristics.
We also provide evidence that this relationship between
emotion perception and trustworthiness judgments extends to
even very subtle emotion cues present in neutral faces. Our results
revealed that the children with ASD did not differ from typical
children with regard to the influence of subtle emotion cues from
neutral faces on trust judgments. There was a negative association
between trust and anger ratings and a positive association between
trust and happiness ratings for both groups of children. Although
the correlation between trust and happiness ratings did not reach
significance for the children with ASD, there was again a
moderate effect size, suggesting that this non-significant result
reflects low statistical power. These results indicate that children
with ASD may also be sensitive to the effects of emotion
overgeneralization and provide further support for an association
between emotional expressions and trust attributions in children
with ASD.
Our findings are consistent with previous adult studies reporting
no significant differences in trustworthiness judgments between
typical adults and adults with ASD [17–19]. However, there are
Table 3. Correlations between the influence of happy and angry expressions on trustworthiness judgments and autism symptom
scores in the children with ASD.
Intensity Expression SCQ scores (n=15)
p r
25% Angry .63 .01
Happy 2.14 .62
50% Angry .08 .77
Happy .05 .86
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097644.t003
Figure 4. Expression recognition ability. Mean thresholds (SEM) for recognition of the angry (A) and happy (B) expressions for each group.
Lower thresholds indicate greater sensitivity to the expression. Individual participants are shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097644.g004
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also studies that have reported atypicalities in response to
trustworthy and untrustworthy faces in adults with ASD
[11,20,21]. It is likely that considerable variation in participant
demographics, matching strategies and task format across studies
contributes to the heterogeneity of results. Moreover, differences in
expression recognition ability between participant groups may
also, in part, account for inconsistencies. This latter explanation
seems plausible given that two of the previous studies reporting
differences in trustworthiness judgments between typical adults
and adults with ASD also report emotion processing impairments
in the ASD group [20,21].
Perhaps critically, the children with ASD in the current study
did not exhibit expression processing impairments. Previous
studies have reported expression recognition difficulties in similar
samples [53,54,55]. However, this group of children with ASD
demonstrated an intact sensitivity to happy and angry expressions
on our measure of expression recognition, which was designed to
be sensitive to detect subtle processing atypicalities. Our study is
not the first to find intact expression processing in individuals with
ASD [56,57–60]. Indeed, despite considerable research attention
the literature remains divided as to whether or not individuals with
ASD show reliable emotion processing impairments [32–35].
Based on our findings, we can conclude that when expression
processing is intact in children with ASD, emotional expressions
influence impressions of trustworthiness from faces.
Clearly, however, an important extension of the current study
will be to investigate trust perception in children with ASD who do
show significant emotion processing impairments. Such research
would allow us to determine whether the modulatory power of
emotion cues on trust judgments can be dissociated from
expression recognition ability. It seems likely that impairments
reading expression information would limit the influence of these
cues on trustworthiness judgments. However, it is also possible that
the modulation of trait judgments by emotion cues may be
independent of explicit expression recognition ability, particularly
given the automatic nature of these appearance-based trait
inferences [4,61].
Interpretation of the current results must take into consideration
the characteristics of our cognitively-able ASD sample. Though
low levels of current autism symptoms in a subset of our sample, as
indexed by scores on the ADOS-2 [40], could limit the
generalizability of our findings, we highlight that all participants
had received an ASD diagnosis from a multidisciplinary team and
were scored above the criterion for ASD on a well-validated
retrospective symptom measure (SCQ) [38]. In addition, our
sample demonstrated other perceptual atypicalities in face
perception, e.g. significant impairments in face recognition,
relative to typical children, as indexed by scores on the CFMT-
C. Moreover, when we reanalyzed our data including only those
children with ASD who met the more conservative current
symptom criterion (score of 7 or above on the ADOS-2), the
modulatory effects of the happy and angry expressions remained
in the predicted direction, with moderate-large effect sizes across
all conditions.
Interestingly, results of our correlational analysis between
symptom severity and the influence of emotion expressions on
trust judgments suggested that children with more severe ASD
symptomatology may overuse certain expression cues. Our results
revealed a positive correlation between symptom severity and the
modulatory power of 25% angry expressions on trust judgments.
That is, more severe ASD symptoms were associated with greater
influence of the 25% angry expressions when judging trustwor-
thiness. This overuse of the angry expression cues may constitute
evidence of atypical trust perception. It would be interesting to see
whether the same profile of trust perception is observed in a larger
sample of children with more severe ASD symptomatology.
The current study adds to a growing body of evidence detailing
intact aspects of social cognition in individuals with ASD. Other
studies have revealed that adults with ASD spontaneously infer
traits, such as whether a person is clever, honest and friendly, from
descriptions of behaviour [62] and children with ASD have been
shown to use social stereotypes to predict behaviour [63,64].
Together these findings suggest that, despite significant impair-
ments in interpersonal understanding, social knowledge is not
universally disrupted in individuals with ASD. Our findings
suggest that trust perception may be another spared social capacity
in ASD. Continued research into other social judgments and trait
attributions will help further our understanding of the complex
profile of social cognitive ability and impairment in individuals
with ASD.
In conclusion, we have shown that impressions of trustworthi-
ness from facial appearances in cognitively-able children with ASD
are significantly modulated by emotional expressions. Angry
expressions diminished the appearance of trustworthiness and
happy expressions increased the appearance of trustworthiness for
the children with ASD, just like for the typically-developing
children. The associations between perceived emotion and
trustworthiness also extended to subtle expression cues present in
neutral faces. These findings indicate that cognitively-able children
with ASD draw upon emotion cues when judging facial
trustworthiness, which suggests that similar mechanisms may
drive trustworthiness inferences in typical children and children
with ASD.
Supporting Information
Appendix S1 This supporting information describes the
results for each task when the data were reanalysed with
only those children with ASD who scored above the
ADOS-2 cut-off for current ASD symptoms (n= 9).
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